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Abstract: This article examines how the new standard for pleading
claims related to patent infringement should be interpreted in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. The facial plausibility of
a pleading requires more than bare allegations and must be supported with
enough facts for the court to infer wrongdoing by the accused infringer. This
article focuses on the application of this new pleading requirement to patent
infringement cases.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is the starting point in understanding
pleading standards in the federal courts. Additionally, the article discusses
the relationship between Rule 8 and Rule 11, specifically in the context of
patent pleading. Form 18, which outlines a basic infringement claim, may be
used for literal infringement according to Federal Rule 84. Judge Dyk's
dissent in the Federal Circuit's McZeal decision, however, raises many ques-
tions about the sufficiency of Form 18 that are pertinent following Iqbal.
This article also addresses what is required for pleading other patent claims,
such as the doctrine of equivalents and contributory infringement.
Some argue that infringement contentions should now be used as a
model for pleading patent-related claims. Each element of a cause of action
should be presented with enough factual matter to allow the court to infer
wrongdoing by the accused infringer. While a greater burden is placed on
the plaintiff to develop and reveal these facts early in the case, this require-
ment also allows the plaintiff to influence the court through favorable claim
interpretations, claim charts, and claim contentions before the accused in-
fringer has a chance to develop contrary facts.
This article presents a framework for pleading patent-related claims
based on case law and local patent rules. Because the Supreme Court's
Iqbal decision and the Federal Circuit's McZeal decision seem to raise more
questions than they answer, the article proposes a methodical approach to
patent pleading that harmonizes the courts' opinions. The pleading require-
ments are interpreted in order to create a roadmap that can be used by both
academics and practitioners alike.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, the standard for suffi-
ciently pleading patent related causes of action has become relatively un-
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clear.2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) governs the pleading
requirements of a complaint, including those related to patent infringement,
and it requires only a "short and plain statement" with a few requirements.3
"Rule 8(a) does not require that a plaintiff plead facts sufficient to show that
it will ultimately succeed on the merits."4 What suffices to show entitlement
to relief has evolved considerably in the last fifty years-especially since the
Twombly decision. The changes in the common law have left ambiguity and
uncertainty in the pleading requirements of a complaint.5 This article at-
tempts to systematically analyze each type of pleading related to a patent-
infringement suit and derive context-specific requirements based on the
analysis.
What is clear from the Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions is
that the change in the common law pleading standard is based on cost-benefit
analysis. "[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be
alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up
the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an
in terrorem increment of the settlement value."6 Before factually complex
and costly litigation proceeds, the district court retains the power to "insist
upon some specificity in [the] pleading."7 The Supreme Court also agreed
with the 7th Circuit's Car Carriers case, which found that litigation costs and
the increasing number of federal cases both argue against allowing discovery
when there is no reasonable likelihood of success suggested by the plaintiffs
complaint.8
2. Literal infringement remains the mainstay in patent infringement pleadings, but
there are many other claims a plaintiff can plead including: the doctrine of
equivalents, joint infringement, inducement, contributory infringement, and
willful infringement. There are also many defenses an accused infringer can
plead such as inequitable conduct, patent misuse, anti-trust, laches, and equita-
ble estoppel. For the purposes of this paper, only inequitable conduct will be
addressed, as it is by far the most prevalent.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
4. Robert A. Matthews, Jr., General Aspects of Notice Pleading in a Complaint, 6
ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 39:1, 2 (2010).
5. In addition to the pleading standard under Rule 8, some courts have also called
into question the role of Rule 11, which requires all factual allegations to have
evidentiary support. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (b)(3). The relationship between Rule 8
and Rule 11 is discussed further in section IV.
6. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007). The Court ex-
panded its argument on discovery cost being used as a weapon: "The threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases before reaching those proceedings." Id. at 559.
7. Id. at 558.
8. Id. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985)).
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The Appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains forms
that give practitioners some guidance in pleading certain causes of action.
Form 18 lists the elements required for pleading literal patent infringement.9
Because Rule 84 appears to grant automatic validity to all of the forms, Form
18 may be used to plead literal patent infringement, notwithstanding ques-
tions of its continued applicability. o This ambiguity leads to especially
troublesome situations if Form 18 is used to plead causes of action other than
literal patent infringement.
In Section H1, this article will give a brief history of pleading practice
from Conley to Twombly and Iqbal. Section III will then discuss Form 18 for
pleading patent infringement and its suggested use through Rule 84. Section
IV will outline Rule 11 and the possible expanded role it could play in deter-
mining the sufficiency of patent pleadings. Section V will begin with the
discussion of patent pleadings after Iqbal in the context of direct infringe-
ment. This will include what the plaintiff should plead to show literal in-
fringement, the doctrine of equivalents, and joint infringement. The article
will also present a formula to show what is required to plead each cause of
action. Section V will then discuss both indirect patent infringement plead-
ings of inducement and contributory infringement. Section V will finish with
discussions of the willful infringement and inequitable conduct pleading
standards. Finally, in Section VI, the conclusion will review the discussion
and recommendations of the standards for pleading patent infringement re-
lated causes.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING PRACTICE
Notice pleading under Rule 8 requires only short and plain statements of
the court's jurisdiction, the claim, and a demand for relief.II More specifi-
cally, Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."12 While the rule is succinctly written,
there has been much debate as to what evidence the plaintiff must possess to
show the court he is indeed "entitled to relief."l3 As of 2009, the Supreme
Court stated that "Rule 8 does not empower [a plaintiff] to plead the bare
elements, . . . affix the label 'general allegation,' and expect his complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss."I4
In a 1957 class-action suit for a declaratory judgment, the Supreme
Court's Conley v. Gibson decision declared that "a complaint should not be
9. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18.
10. See id. at (3).
I1. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
12. Id.
13. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-
58.
14. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1954.
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dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."'5 The Court noted that Rule 8 only requires a "short and plain
statement" and not a claim based on exhaustive facts.16 This liberal pleading
standard was designed to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plain-
tiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."l7 The Court also noted
that the Forms included with the Rules demonstrate the low threshold to
plead certain causes of action.' 8
In 2007, the Supreme Court articulated a new pleading standard in Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly that abrogated Conley's "no set of facts" as "an incom-
plete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard." 9 The Twombly
Court reiterated that a pleading under Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "'a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'
in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."'20 In redefining the pleading standard, though,
the Twombly Court first added that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclu-
sions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do."21
The Supreme Court also required: "[flactual allegations [to] be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."22 The
plaintiff must distinguish the defendant's behavior as more than "consistent
with [illegality] but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy."23 A complaint must include allegations,
whether direct or inferential, as to all material elements of the cause of ac-
tion.24 Twombly also reiterated the district courts' inherent freedom to allow
15. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 47.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). The Court, later in the
opinion, also said "judges and commentators have balked at taking the literal
terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard." Id. at 562.
20. Id. at 555.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 554. This leaves the defendant's actions in legally-neutral territory. See
id. at 557.
24. Id. at 562.
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a tenuous complaint "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
those facts is improbable, and 'that recovery is very remote and unlikely."25
The Twombly Court went to great lengths to address the role of alleged
facts in pleadings. In the antitrust context, the Court said a complaint "must
be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not
merely parallel conduct that could . . . be independent action." 26 Benjamin
Spencer distilled four presumptions from the Twombly decision:
(1) If allegations of objective facts present a scernario that, if true,
suggests wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, that scena-
rio possesses a presumption of impropriety and thus suffi-
ciently states a claim;
(2) If allegations of objective facts present a scenario that, if true,
is neutral with respect to wrongdoing by the defendant, that
scenario enjoys a presumption of propriety and thus fails to
state a claim;
(3) If the objective facts alleged present a scenario that enjoys a
presumption of propriety, the addition of speculative supposi-
tions to suggest wrongdoing will not overcome that presump-
tion and the pleading will fail to state a claim; and
(4) If the objective facts alleged present a scenario that enjoys a
presumption of propriety, the addition of supported implica-
tions that suggest wrongdoing will overcome that presumption
and thus the pleading will properly state a claim.27
With his assertion that "[t]he key dividing line seems to be between
claims that require suppositions to connote wrongdoing and those based on
facts that indicate impropriety on their own," Spencer assumes that a plead-
ing contains objective facts within it.28
Almost two years after deciding Twombly, the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the standard for pleading under Rule 8 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In that
case, the Court held that a plaintiff must plead facially plausible factual mat-
ter to suggest wrongdoing.29 The Court defined facial plausibility as "factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defen-
dant is liable. The plausibility standard is not . . . a probability requirement,
25. Id. at 556.
26. Id. at 557.
27. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1,
15-17 (2009).
28. Id. at 33.
29. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009) ("[T]o state a claim
based on a violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead suffi-
cient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the de-
tention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the
purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.").
2010] 305
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but it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully."30
The Court laid out two principles to determine the sufficiency of a
pleading. First, all allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true, ex-
cept for legal conclusions.31 Second, a complaint must state a plausible claim
for relief.32 The Supreme Court stated that "[dietermining whether a com-
plaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon its judicial experience and com-
mon sense."33 However, courts will not consider conclusory statements that
lack a factual basis.34 If the complaint contains well-pled factual allegations,
a court should accept them as true and move on to a determination of plausi-
bility.35 The Supreme Court also stated, however, that "where the well-pled
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of mis-
conduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . . As such, the allegations are conclusory." 36 In other
words, the reviewing court should determine the plausibility of the claims in
the context of more likely explanations.37
III. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FoRM 18
The Appendix to the Federal Rules sets out the basic criteria for plead-
ing patent infringement in Form 18.38 The form is very simple and requires
five things: (1) a statement of jurisdiction, (2) ownership of the patent-in-suit
by the plaintiff, (3) an allegation of infringement by the defendant's product,
(4) compliance with statutory notice requirements, and (5) a demand for re-
lief.39 Rule 84 states that "[tihe forms in the Appendix suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate."40
According to the Federal Rules and the forms, pleading a patent-infringement
case seems formulaic and uncomplicated.
30. Id. at 1949.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1950.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1954.
35. Id. at 1950.
36. Id. at 1950-51.
37. Id. at 1951.
38. FED. R. Civ. PROC. Form 18.
39. Id.
40. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 84.
[Vol. XIII306
Patent Pleading Standards After Iqbal
In practice, however, the application of Form 18 is not as straightfor-
ward as it appears. 4 1 The Federal Circuit's decision in McZeal illustrates the
problem of when and how to apply Form 18 to different patent-infringement
pleadings. In McZeal, the pro se plaintiff and owner of a patent sued Nextel
for direct infringement under the theory of literal infringement and the doc-
trine of equivalents.42 His complaint followed the requirements of Form 18:
it asserted ownership of the patent-in-suit, named Nextel as the defendant,
cited the allegedly infringed patent, described the means of infringement, and
pointed to the patent law that entitled him to relief.43 The Federal Circuit
panel found the pleading was sufficient to put the defendant on notice and
allowed the pleading.44 Because McZeal's complaint contained enough de-
tail for Nextel to answer, the circuit panel's majority required nothing more
from the plaintiff in spite of the fact that McZeal "conceded that he didn't
know what device, what mechanisms or what means Nextel uses to transmit
and connect its telephone customers to the rest of the world."45 The majority
believed "the specifics of how Sprint Nextel's purportedly infringing device
works is something to be determined through discovery."46
Judge Dyk strongly dissented from the majority's holding because he
believed Form 18 did not meet the standard for pleading direct infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.47 In addition, he went further and argued
that "a bare allegation of literal infringement using [Form 18] is inadequate
to provide sufficient notice to an accused infringer under a theory of literal
41. For example, the standard for pleadings by a pro se litigant may be relaxed by
the reviewing court. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d. 1354, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2007), affd on other grounds, 335 Fed. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("[P]leadings of pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard than those
drafted by lawyers when determining whether the complaint should be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim.").
42. Id. at 1355. Judge Dyk, in his dissent, refers to parts of the record that indicate
that the plaintiff had abandoned his allegation of literal infringement and only
retained the doctrine of equivalents complaint. See id. at 1359 n.] (Dyk, J.
dissenting).
43. Id. at 1357.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1357-58.
46. Id. at 1358.
47. Id. at 1359 n.l (Dyk, J. dissenting) ("At the hearing before the district court,
McZeal appeared not to contend that the claim limitations were literally satis-
fied. Sprint notes in its brief that McZeal 'limited his pleading to a charge of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,' Appellee's Br. at 18, and
McZeal did not dispute this assertion in his reply. Even if one were to read the
complaint as alleging literal infringement as well as infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, I see no basis for declining to affirm the district court's
dismissal of the doctrine of equivalents claim.").
2010] 307
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infringement."48 Judge Dyk agreed with the district court, which believed
that "without some factual allegations in the complaint, it is hard to see how
a claimant could satisfy the requirement of not only fair notice of the nature
of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests." 4 9 Because McZeal
was decided before Iqbal, the application of Form 18 to direct and indirect
infringement, along with the other causes of action in patent litigation, was
unclear. Subsequent commentators have agreed with Judge Dyk, stating that
"[u]nless the complaint identifies how particular features of a product in-
fringe specific claims, it is hard to see how a complaint includes sufficient
facts to render plausible an infringement claim under Iqbal."50
The Rules require courts to allow pleadings of patent infringement
based on Form 18. It is unclear, however, for which specific types of in-
fringement pleadings the form is sufficient and for which types of pleadings
it is insufficient. The Iqbal Court acknowledged that the determination of a
complaint's facial plausibility is a "context-specific task" and will require
"judicial experience and common sense."51 Patent litigation has always been
treated differently from other forms of litigation, and patent pleading subse-
quent to Iqbal seems to call for a new analysis.52
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
Rule 11 (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that by
presenting a pleading to the court, an attorney "certifies that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reason-
able under the circumstances . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery."53
This has been interpreted as placing a burden on an attorney to "stop, think,
and investigate" before filing a document with the court. 54 Rule 11 attempts
to reduce unwarranted expense and delay caused by judicial system abuse.55
As applied to patent infringement complaints, Rule 11 requires "the attorney
[to] interpret the asserted patent claims and compare the accused device with
those claims before filing a claim alleging infringement."56 "[T]he key factor
48. Id. at 1360 (Dyk, J. dissenting).
49. Id. at 1362 (Dyk, J. dissenting).
50. Kenneth O'Rourke, et al., Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Sleeper Supreme Court Deci-
sion for Patent Litigators?, 21 No. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6, 8 (2009).
51. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 .
52. The Federal Circuit was created in an effort to harmonize the law of patents.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (b)(3).
54. See Amendments to Rules 97 F.R.D. 165, 192 (1983).
55. Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
56. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1300-01 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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in determining whether a patentee performed a reasonable pre-filing inquiry
is the presence of an infringement analysis . . . [consisting of] a good faith,
informed comparison of the claims of a patent against the accused subject
matter."57 In order to reach the conclusion that infringement has occurred,
the plaintiffs attorney must find that the accused product falls within those
interpreted claims.58
The impact of Rule 1I's requirement of a pre-filing inquiry on the stan-
dard for stating a claim under Rule 8 is unclear after Iqbal. Judge Seeborg of
the Northern District of California, in interpreting the relationship between
the two Rules, noted that compliance with Rules 8 and 11 are two different
issues. "Rule 8 requires factual allegations sufficient to show entitlement to
relief. Under Rule 11, an attorney ... ordinarily is deemed to be represent-
ing . . . that the factual contentions have evidentiary support."59 While these
two Rules may not have an explicit relationship, it logically follows that for a
pleading to show facially plausible factual allegations, an attorney must nec-
essarily have some evidentiary support. In other words, the pleading require-
ments of Rule 8 cannot be satisfied if Rule II is not satisfied as well.60
V. PATENT INFRINGEMENT PLEADINGs AFTER IQBAL
Applying the principles of Twombly and Iqbal to patent pleading, a
facially plausible claim "showing the pleader is entitled to relief' requires
more than bare allegations of infringement. While the plaintiff is not re-
quired to have evidence sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment
at the pleading stage, facial plausibility requires more than serving notice to
the defendant. What was once required by some local rules as an infringe-
ment contention may now be the standard for pleading patent infringement.61
57. Id. at 1302.
58. Judin, 110 F.3d at 784.
59. Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS 2009 WL
2972374 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009).
60. Spencer, supra note 27, at 31. Spencer alludes to as much in his article, stating
"[a]nother possibility would be to hold counsel to their obligation under Rule
11 to certify that factual contentions will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
61. See N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1 (2008) Disclosure of Asserted Claims and
Infringement Contentions ("(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is alleg-
edly infringed by each opposing party; (b) Separately for each asserted claim,
each accused apparatus, product, device, process, method, act, or other instru-
mentality ("Accused Instrumentality") of each opposing party of which the
party is aware. This identification shall be as specific as possible. Each prod-
uct, device, and apparatus must be identified by name or model number, if
known. Each method or process must be identified by name, if known, or by
any product, device, or apparatus which, when used, allegedly results in the
practice of the claimed method or process; (c) A chart identifying specifically
where each element of each asserted claim is found within each Accused In-
2010] 309
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"While the Court wants more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
claim, there is still a lot of gray area as to just what facts a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim."62 Taking this into consideration, a format for suffi-
ciently pleading an infringement claim can be derived based on Twombly's
requirement that a complaint "contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some
viable legal theory."63
To overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the elements of the plead-
ing's claims should first be laid out in sequential order just as in an infringe-
ment contention.64 This allows the judge to easily assess the validity of the
claim and the plausibility of the facts supporting each element. The Twombly
Court also held that an adequately stated claim "may be supported by show-
ing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint."65
Therefore, the plaintiff should plead facts showing or supporting an inference
of misconduct by the defendant. Additionally, the plaintiff should attempt to
minimize the plausibility of alternate, neutral-territory explanations of the
defendant's conduct.66 While the standard is context-specific and based on
whether a presumption of propriety exists, the plaintiff should objectively
consider whether common sense points to infringement as the most plausible
explanation.
1. Direct Infringement
A direct infringer is statutorily defined as "whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
strumentality, including for each element that such party contends is governed
by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in
the Accused Instrumentality that performs the claimed function; (d) Whether
each element of each asserted claim is claimed to be literally present or present
under the doctrine of equivalents in the Accused Instrumentality; (e) For any
patent that claims priority to an earlier application, the priority date to which
each asserted claim allegedly is entitled; and (f) If a party claiming patent in-
fringement wishes to preserve the right to rely, for any purpose, on the asser-
tion that its own apparatus, product, device, process, method, act, or other
instrumentality practices the claimed invention, the party must identify, sepa-
rately for each asserted claim, each such apparatus, product, device, process,
method, act, or other instrumentality that incorporates or reflects that particular
claim."). Accord E.D.Tex. Appendix M Local Patent Rules 3-1 2007.
62. Douglas E. Motzenbecker, Supreme Court Raises the Pleadings Bar Again, 35
No. 2 LITIG. NEWS, Winter 2010 at 11.
63. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
64. See N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1.
65. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
66. Id. at 557.
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States . . . during the term of the patent."67 Literal infringement, doctrine of
equivalents, and joint infringement all comprise direct infringement which is
"a strict liability offense, but is limited to those who practice each and every
element of the claimed invention."68 As the Federal Circuit in McZeal stated,
though, a plaintiff is not required to plead element-by-element of the patent-
in-suit and "a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged
infringer on notice as to what he must defend."69 District courts have contin-
ued to question the applicability of Form 18 to all of the types of direct
infringement, especially after the Supreme Court's ruling in iqbal.70 The fol-
lowing three subsections discuss the forms of direct infringement and what
should be the standard for pleading each in a post-Iqbal context.
a. Literal Infringement
A complaint for literal infringement "demands that the accused product
possess each and every limitation of at least one of the patent claims in
suit."71 All elements of the patent-in-suit's claims must be found in the ac-
cused infringer's device.72 Form 18, which lists the five requirements of a
patent infringement pleading, seems most applicable to literal infringement.
In his McZeal dissent, Judge Dyk argued that not only was Form 18 inappli-
cable to the doctrine of equivalents, but that it should be inapplicable to lit-
eral infringement as well.73 Both the McZeal majority and dissent finally
67. 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (2006).
68. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Each of these doctrines is defined and analyzed in the following subsections.
69. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d. 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff'd on
other grounds, 335 Fed. Appx. 966 (Fed. Cir. 2009); cf. Realtime Data, LLC v.
Stanley, 2010 WL 2403779 at *5 (E.D.Tex. June 10, 2010) ("While Realtime
accuses Defendants' 'data compression products and/or services,' the Court
finds this to be a vague identification and without further context it is unclear
as to what 'data compression products and/or services' refers.").
70. See, e.g., Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS 2009
WL 2972374 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009); Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho,
No. C09-1043JLR 2009 WL 4432367 at *3 n.5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2009);
but see Automated Transactions, LLC v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., No.
10-CV-00407(A)(M) at 9 (W.D.N.Y. August 31, 2010) ("[U]nless or until Rule
84 is amended, I conclude that the sufficiency of [the Plaintiff's] direct in-
fringement allegations is governed by Appendix Form 18, not by the require-
ments of Twombly or Iqbal.").
71. Craig Allen Nard, THE LAW OF PATENTS 434 (2008).
72. Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.SPQ.2d 1280, 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd,
91 F.3d 166 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
73. McZeal, 501 F.3d. at 1360-61 (Dyk, J. dissenting).
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agreed, however, that Form 18 controlled the pleading of a literal infringe-
ment claim.74
But McZeal was decided before Iqbal. There has been a post-Iqbal de-
bate over Form 18's continued viability as a pleading standard, even for lit-
eral infringement, because "[tlhe allegation that a product includes all the
basic elements of a patent is merely the recitation of the infringement cause
of action . . . [and] should arguably be ignored at the motion to dismiss stage
as being conclusory."75 "It is not easy to directly reconcile Form 18 with the
guidance of the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal; while the form un-
doubtedly provides a short and plain statement, it offers little to show that the
pleader is entitled to relief."76 On its face, Form 18 appears to be nothing
more than a legal conclusion, which is precisely what Iqbal said the court
should not rely upon. 77 The accused infringer cannot receive sufficient no-
tice when the plaintiff only provides bare allegations and legal conclusions of
infringement. "[Form 18] fails to state which claims are asserted and which
features of the accused device are alleged to infringe the limitations of those
claims."78 But "[t]he line between factual allegations and legal conclusions
is not always clear."79 Even the most outspoken judicial critics of Form 18
accede to the notion that Rule 84 requires a court to "accept as sufficient any
pleading made in conformance with the forms."80 As of today, Form 18 can
still be used to plead literal patent infringement despite its apparent incongru-
ence with Twombly and Iqbal.81
74. Id. at 1360. ("I agree that under Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, we would be required to find that a bare allegation of literal infringement
in accordance with Form [18] would be sufficient under Rule 8 to state a
claim.").
75. O'Rourke, supra note 50, at 8.
76. Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS 2009 WL
2972374 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009).
77. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
78. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d. 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff'd on
other grounds, 335 Fed. Appx. 966 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
79. Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C09-1043JLR 2009 WL 4432367 at *3
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2009).
80. Elan, 2009 WL 2972374 at *2; Traffic Info., LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., 2010 WL
254500 at *2 (E.D.Tex. April 13, 2010) ("The Supreme Court's decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal have not affected the adequacy of complying with Form 18.
To hold otherwise would render Rule 84 and Form 18 invalid.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
81. Sharafabadi, 2009 WL 4432367 at *2 ("The Federal Circuit and a range of
district courts have concluded that the sample complaint in Form 18 meets the
Twombly standard."); cf. WIAV Networks, LLC v. 3COM Corp., 2009 WL
6048922 at *3 (E.D.Tex. Dec. 15, 2009).
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b. Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created doctrine that evolved
in response to the strict requirements of literal infringement.82 The Supreme
Court reasoned that limiting an infringer to a literal interpretation of patent
claims would "place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would
subordinate substance to form."83 Because the English language is broad and
interchangeable, the Court found it necessary to expand the reach of an alleg-
edly infringed patentee by creating the doctrine of equivalents.84 This doc-
trine prevented an accused infringer from avoiding liability by changing only
minor or insubstantial details of a claimed invention while retaining the in-
vention's identity.85
The doctrine of equivalents is a determination of fact applied to each
individual element and not the entire invention as a whole.86 "In determining
equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other
and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may sometimes be
equivalents."87 The Supreme Court listed four factors that must be consid-
ered in determining equivalence:
[1] the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent;
[2] the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients;
[3] the function which it is intended to perform; [and]
[4] whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have
known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained
in the patent with one that was.88
In the seminal Graver Tank case, the Supreme Court said a doctrine-of-
equivalents claim may "proceed against the producer of a device if it per-
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
the same result."89
82. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
83. Id. at 607.
84. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730-32 (2002).
85. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
86. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
87. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
88. Id.
89. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Sanitary Re-
frigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). The doctrine of equivalents
could restrict the claims of a patent-in-suit "where a device is so far changed in
principle from a patented article that it performs the same or similar function in
a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of
the claim." Id. at 608-9.
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By applying Iqbal to patent-infringement pleadings based on the doc-
trine of equivalents, "judicial experience and common sense" would seem to
suggest something more than Form 18 would be necessary to "give the de-
fendant fair notice of . . . the claim . . . and the grounds upon which it
rests."9o The forms predate the Supreme Court's creation of the doctrine by
over ten years, and thus their creators could not have contemplated this de-
velopment in common-law doctrine.91 The Twombly Court suggested that
the Forms should not be used for causes of action other than those specifi-
cally described in the Form.92 In his McZeal dissent, Judge Dyk argued that
"Form [18] does not appear on its face to address the doctrine of
equivalents."93 Specificity as to which of the patent-in-suit's elements are
infringed by the defendant's products, as required in infringement conten-
tions, seems mandatory to show how an "accused product is insubstantially
different from the patented devices."94
Without more than conclusory allegations of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, the defendant is not put on notice as to how to an-
swer the complaint. "[T]o create an issue of material fact [under the doctrine
of equivalents,] a patentee must prove infringement on a limitation-by-limita-
tion basis by submitting particularized testimony."95 The evidence used to
prove infringement by the doctrine of equivalents must be more than
"[g]eneralized testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims and
the accused infringer's product."96 The facial plausibility standard for a
pleading is lower than the standard of sufficiency of the non-movant's evi-
dence needed to defeat a motion for summary judgment. But the intensely
technical and factual nature of a doctrine-of-equivalents cause of action ne-
90. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
91. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff'd on
other grounds, 335 Fed. Appx. 966 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Dyk, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("The form itself, which became effective in 1938, long
predates the modem day doctrine of equivalents articulated by the Supreme
Court more than a decade later in Graver Tank . . . .").
92. Id. ("The Supreme Court in [Twombly] suggests that the forms should not be
interpreted as going beyond the fact situation described in the form.").
93. Id.
94. Id.; see N.D.Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1 (2008).
95. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1363.
96. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997) (stating that "[plursuant to
our precedent, a patentee must still provide particularized testimony and link-
ing arguments as to the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed
invention and the accused device or process, or with respect to the function,
way, result test when such evidence is presented to support a finding of in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents.") (internal quotes omitted).
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cessitates "some specificity in both alleging and proving a doctrine-of-
equivalents claim" above general accusations.97 A claim that is not facially
plausible and contains only legal conclusions exposes the defendant to "po-
tentially extensive discovery before a motion for summary judgment may be
filed."98 "It is necessary to allege sufficient facts in the complaint so that
when the allegations . . . , however true, could not raise a claim of entitle-
ment to relief, this basic deficiency is exposed at the point of minimum ex-
penditure of time and money by the parties and the court."99 Therefore,
Form 18 appears ill-suited for pleading infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
The Federal Circuit, in the context of Rule 11 sanctions, has said that "a
claim chart is not a requirement of a pre-filing infringement analysis, as the
owner [or] inventor . . . of a patent ought to have a clear idea of what the
patent covers."100 While not required, a claim chart comparing the patentee's
claims and the defendant's product should be enough to show the complaint
is facially plausible.10 A pre-filing infringement analysis, consisting of an
informed comparison of the claims and the accused subject matter, should
also be enough to show the plaintiff is entitled to relief.102
In determining what should be required in a patent-infringement plead-
ing under the doctrine of equivalents, a court should begin with the two Iqbal
principles. First, the patentee should plead objective facts, and the court
must accept them as true. 0 3 Legal conclusions with bare allegations of in-
fringement will not suffice.104 Second, the complaint must state a facially
plausible claim for relief under the standard of the doctrine of equivalents.105
This requires something more than Form 18, but possibly less than an in-
depth, element-by-element analysis of equivalence in order for the defen-
97. McZeal, 501 F.3d. at 1363 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1362.
99. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 127 S. Ct. 1961, 1966
(1957)).
100. Q-Pharm, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
101. Cf. N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1 (2008) (requiring claim chart 14 days
after the Initial Case Management Conference, but including a claim chart with
the pleading has the additional benefit of getting the plaintiffs claim construc-
tion in front of the judge very early and may work as an intimidation factor
against the defendant).
102. Q-Pharm, 360 F.3d at 1300-01.
103. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1950.
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dant's actions as set forth in the pleading to suffer from a "presumption of
impropriety."l106
Allegations supported by fact must allow the court to infer that the de-
fendant's product "performs substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to obtain the same result."107 A detailed, element-by-element
infringement contention comparing the patentee's claims to the allegedly in-
fringing product, such as what is currently required in an infringement con-
tention, would seem to give a presumption of impropriety and be sufficient to
put the defendant on notice. 08 Something less, if "supported [by] implica-
tions" that suggests wrongdoing, may also properly state a claim, but the
minimum quantum of evidence required remains in flux.10 9
What is required to be facially plausible is still unclear. But it seems
clear that a plaintiffs complaint based on the doctrine of equivalents requires
more than the allegations of Form 18 to state a "claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief' and put the defendant on notice of which product
is allegedly infringing which claim so that he may competently answer.10
c. Joint Infringement
The standard for pleading joint infringement is also uncertain after
Iqbal. The definition of direct infringement requires that all claims of a pat-
ent be performed by a single actor for infringement to be found.I' In addi-
tion, the Federal Circuit has held that "where the actions of multiple parties
combine to perform every step of a claimed [invention], the claim is directly
infringed only if one party exercises control or direction over the entire pro-
cess such that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the mas-
termind."112 While this extra element may be difficult to prove, the Federal
106. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 15.
107. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(internal quotes omitted) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30 (1929)).
108. See N.D.Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1 (2008).
109. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 18.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Ill. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
112. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added). In BMC, the Federal Circuit more clearly defined when
joint infringement was applicable: "vicarious liability might seem to provide a
loophole for a party to escape infringement by having a third party carry out
one or more of the claimed steps on its behalf. To the contrary, the law im-
poses vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another in circumstances
showing that the liable party controlled the conduct of the acting party." BMC
Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(emphasis added).
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Circuit has not lowered the bar in proving joint infringement.]3 In fact, the
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the control or direction standard for joint
infringement "may in some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-
length agreements to avoid infringement."'14 A party cannot, however, con-
tract or outsource around infringement if it retains control over the conduct
of the third party."l5 Therefore, to plead joint infringement, direct infringe-
ment must be shown along with the additional element of "control or direc-
tion" by one of the parties. Because Form 18 does not address the additional
element necessary to prove joint infringement, the Form seems insufficient
for pleading joint infringement as well.
Sufficient facts evincing control or direction by a joint infringer must be
pled to overcome the presumption of propriety afforded normal business
practice.116 Without evidence showing this element, the court cannot discern
between arms-length agreements and control or direction by a mastermind,
and thus the pleading should fail.,17 Something more than speculative allega-
tions or legal conclusions is required. Factually supported, facially plausible
allegations that suggest wrongdoing-as opposed to mere arms-length agree-
ment-would suffice to show the plaintiff is entitled to relief.'18 This addi-
tional element requires evidence to overcome the presumption of neutrality
initially assumed by the court. 19 The court can make an inference of control
or direction based on evidence showing the joint infringer is responsible for
the actions of a third party or that a third party acted on behalf of the joint
infringer.120 It is possible that a party cannot know ex ante of the alleged
113. Desenberg v. Google, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10121(GBD)(AJP), 2009 WL 2337122,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009); accord BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 ("Nonetheless,
[the] court will not unilaterally restructure the claim or the standards for joint
infringement to remedy these ill-conceived claims.").
114. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
115. See Desenberg, 2009 WL 2337122, at *7.
116. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 16.
117. The Federal Circuit has offered a preventative solution as well: "[tlhe concerns
over a party avoiding infringement by arms-length cooperation can usually be
offset by proper claim drafting." BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381.
118. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 18; cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
t19. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 ("A statement of parallel conduct ... needs
some setting suggesting an agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; with-
out that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an ac-
count of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory."); see also
Spencer, supra note 27, at 17.
120. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1585 (2009). Presumably, this could be shown
by a contract or communications between the parties, or an affidavit of some-
one with direct knowledge of the control.
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control and may have to plead literal infringement until a joint infringement
theory can be supported through discovery. The court may take this into
consideration in allowing limited discovery if the judge feels there is a good
probability that some evidence of control will be found.
2. Indirect Infringement
While direct infringement involves a single actor, indirect infringement
involves multiple parties working together to infringe. "Where a defendant
participates in infringement but does not directly infringe a patent, the law
provides remedies under principles of indirect infringement."l21 There are
two types of indirect infringement: inducement and contributory infringe-
ment.122 For an indirect infringement to occur, a predicate direct infringe-
ment, committed entirely by one of the actors, must occur as well.123 It is the
patentee's burden to show the direct infringement for each instance of indi-
rect infringement.124
Even if Form 18 can arguably be applied to direct literal infringement, it
is inapplicable for pleading indirect infringement. There is no official form
for indirect infringement analogous to direct infringement.125 Inducement
and contributory infringement both comprise elements in addition to those on
Form 18, and thus something more is required in the pleading.126 The in-
fringement contentions used by the district courts should again serve as a
guide to adequately pleading indirect infringement.127 Like joint infringe-
ment, some of the factual evidence required to prove indirect infringement
121. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380.
122. 35 U.S.C. §271(b)-(c) (2003).
123. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379; DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-EM Inc., at 670 F. Supp. 2d 349,
354 (D. Del. 2009).
124. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1303.
125. Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C09-1043JLR, 2009 WL 4432367 at *3
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2009).
126. Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 09-01531 RS, 2009 WL
2972374 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys.,
Inc., 2010 WL 2026627 at *3 (E.D.Tex. May 6, 2010) ("Form 18 does not
expressly address indirect infringement claims, and courts are split on the
pleading requirements of indirect infringement."); cf. Realtime Data, LLC v.
Stanley, 2010 WL 2403779 at *6 (E.D.Tex. June 10, 2010). ("While acknowl-
edging the competing approaches, the Court here evaluates the sufficiency of
the Complaint in light of recent decisions requiring that a complaint alleging
indirect infringement affirmatively 'identify which claims are indirectly in-
fringed,' 'identify which methods or systems indirectly infringe,' and 'identify
a direct infringer in reference to indirect infringement claims.' ") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
127. See N.D.Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1.
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may not be available to a party ex ante, and thus the court may be more
lenient on the pleading standard in these specific contexts.128 Even taking
these difficulties into account, the patentee's complaint must make a showing
of evidence to allow the court to infer wrongdoing by the accused infringer.
a. Inducement
Indirect infringement by inducement is statutorily prohibited: "Whoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."29 It
is the plaintiffs burden to show that the defendant induced a direct infringe-
ment and that the accused infringer "knew or should have known his actions
would induce actual infringement [which] necessarily [requires] that he or
she knew of the [actual] patent."l 30 In addition, the patentee must also show
"[the accused infringer] actively and knowingly aided and abetted another's
direct infringement."31 But "mere knowledge of possible infringement by
others does not amount to inducement; specific intent and action to induce
infringement [are also required]."l 32
Pleading inducement should require more from the plaintiff than just
submitting Form 18. Based on case law, the elements needed to prove in-
ducement are that the accused infringer: (1) induced an underlying direct
infringement; (2) knew of the patent-in-suit; (3) possessed "specific intent to
128. A relatively relaxed pleading standard with discovery on the elements that can-
not be known ex ante may be the court's best option in balancing the efficiency
and justice factors behind the notice pleading standard.
129. 35 U.S.C. §271(b) (2003). Inducement is also defined and prohibited with re-
gards to exports under 35 U.S.C. §271(f) (2003) ("(1) Whoever without author-
ity supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such com-
ponents are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside the United States in a man-
ner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the
United States, shall be liable as an infringer.").
130. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C09-1043JLR, 2009 WL 4432367 at *4
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2009) (Once direct infringement is shown by the paten-
tee, two additional elements are required: "[f] the alleged infringer committed
an act that constitutes infringement, and [2] the alleged infringer intended to
cause direct infringement.").See also Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
2010 WL 2026627 at *3 (E.D.Tex. May 6, 2010) ("Eolas has not alleged a
direct infringer in relation to its indirect infringement claims [and]
[a]ccordingly, Eolas's indirect infringement claim does not state a claim for
indirect infringement that is plausible on its face.").
131. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1305.
132. Id.; accord BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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encourage another's infringement;"i33 and (4) took active steps to encourage
another's infringement.134 Because Form 18 only covers direct infringement,
there are three additional elements that must be pled and supported by facts.
First, the patentee must show that the accused inducer had knowledge of
the patent. The court, in applying its "judicial experience and common
sense," should require factually supported allegations that the defendant
knew of the patent.135 This could be shown by direct evidence of knowledge
or "supported implications" that suggest knowledge, but nonetheless some-
thing more than bald accusations are required.136
Second, specific intent requires more than knowledge of a possible in-
fringement by another. Because of this, the plaintiff's pleading must over-
come the presumption of propriety enjoyed by the accused defendant.137 In
proving inducement at trial, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove
intent.138 The court, however, may be reluctant "to find liability when a de-
fendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use."139
Therefore, at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must have factually-supported
allegations that "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct."140 The evidentiary matter required to support a pleading is less
than that at summary judgment or trial, but even the complaint must be
facially plausible.
The last additional element of inducement beyond what Form 18 re-
quires is that the accused infringer took active steps to induce direct infringe-
ment by another.141 To establish liability, the plaintiff must plead factual
allegations that show the defendant was proactive in using its product to in-
fringe. This may be shown by evidence of advertisement, encouragement, or
instruction on how to engage on an infringing use.142 Evidence showing ac-
tive steps need not be available ex ante, but a sufficient pleading should in-
clude all publically available facts that could raise an inference that discovery
would bring more evidence.
133. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
134. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
135. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
136. Spencer, supra note 27, at 17.
137. See id.
138. Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
139. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.
140. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
141. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
142. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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b. Contributory Infringement
The second type of indirect infringement is contributory infringement,
which is defined by 35 U.S.C. §271(c).143 A showing of an underlying direct
infringement is a predicate element of contributory infringement.144 In addi-
tion, "[c]ontributory infringement ... requires a mens rea (knowledge) and is
limited to sales of components or materials without substantial non-infring-
ing uses."45 There are four elements of contributory infringement:
[1] The alleged contributory infringer ... made or sold the com-
ponent in question;
[2] The component must have no substantial non-infringing uses;
[3] The alleged contributory infringer had knowledge of the non-
staple nature of the component; [and]
[4] The alleged contributory infringer engaged in conduct within
the United States that contributed to another's direct
infringement.146
The non-staple article requirement prevents a patentee from blocking
the use of an article or component with substantial non-infringing uses to
protect the public interest.147 It requires the alleged infringer to know there
was not a substantial non-infringing use for the component. 148 This requisite
intent is not totally defined, however, and may not even require knowledge
of the "patent [or] knowledge that the component was especially made or
adapted for use in an infringing manner."l49 Thus, knowledge of infringe-
143. "Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Contribu-
tory infringement, as applied to imports into the United States, is defined and
prohibited by 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2003).
144. Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C09-1043JLR, 2009 WL 4432367 at *4
(W.D. Wash. 2009); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-EM Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 349,
354 (D. Del 2009).
145. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
146. See NARD, supra note 71, at 528.
147. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
148. In other words, the no substantial non-infringing use means that the accused
device cannot be used for anything substantial beyond what the claims of the
patent-in-suit define.
149. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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ment will be presumed based on the non-staple nature of the article.150
Therefore, a presumption of the defendant's impropriety will be created if the
component in question has no other substantial non-infringing uses.151
As with inducement, the additional elements required for contributory
infringement are not addressed in Form 18, and thus Form 18 is insufficient
for pleading contributory infringement. In practice, whether the defendant
made or sold the component in question should almost never be in doubt.
The non-staple nature of the component, however, may be harder to plead
sufficiently. The patentee has the burden to show the allegedly infringing
component had no other substantial non-infringing uses, and the burden to
plead the non-staple nature.152 This would appear to be a very context-spe-
cific task requiring the court to "infer more than the mere possibility of mis-
conduct," 53 to overcome a presumption of propriety enjoyed by the
defendant.154 Well-pled factual allegations showing the facial plausibility of
the claim for relief should be included with the complaint.155 Therefore, fac-
tual allegations showing the non-staple nature of the component must be
plausible on their face in order for the patentee to enjoy non-staple article
presumption. Finally, Form 18 only works to plead for contribution to an
underlying direct infringement, but even this element would require a plausi-
ble showing of the defendant's contribution as well.
150. NARD, supra note 71, at 530.
151. This is comparable to Spencer's scenario suggesting misconduct that would
have a presumption of impropriety. See Spencer, supra note 27, at 15.
152. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-EM Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D. Del 2009).
153. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
154. In C.R. Bard, the defendant was charged with contributory infringement. In the
context of a summary judgment motion, the court reasoned through the possi-
ble infringing and non-infringing uses of the accused device: "It would appear
that three possible fact patterns may arise in the course of using the [defen-
dant's] catheter. The first pattern involves positioning the catheter such that all
of its side openings are located only in the aorta. This is clearly contemplated
by the prior art '725 patent cited by the examiner. In the second of the possible
fact patterns, all of the side openings are located within the coronary artery.
This situation appears to have been contemplated by the '017 patent, the
method patent at issue. In the third fact pattern, some of the side openings are
located in the aorta and some are located in the artery. . . . [O]n this record a
reasonable jury could find that, pursuant to the procedure described in the first
of the fact patterns (a non-infringing procedure), there are substantial non-in-
fringing uses for the [defendant's] catheter." C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Car-
diovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
155. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 ("When there are well pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement of relief.").
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3. Willful Infringement
Unlike direct and indirect infringement, willfulness is used only as a
factor in determining damages. Section 284 provides that "the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed."156
The Supreme Court added, "the word willful is widely used in the law, and
although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent interpreta-
tion, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely negli-
gent."157 Willfulness is not fraud, however, and "the pleading requirement
for willful infringement does not rise to the stringent standard required by
Rule 9(b)."158 The minimum standard for willfulness includes reckless be-
havior.159 At trial, the patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that "the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent."16o Many factors contribute to
willfulness, and "[d]etermination of willfulness is made on consideration of
the totality of the circumstances."l61 These factors, weighed by the trier of
fact, consist of:
(1) Whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or designs
of another;
(2) Whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a
good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not
infringed;
(3) The infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation;
(4) Defendant's size and financial condition[;]
(5) Closeness of the case[;]
(6) Duration of the defendant's misconduct[;]
(7) Remedial action by the defendant[;]
(8) Defendant's motivation for harm[; and]
156. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). Section 285 adds "[t]he court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1952).
157. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988) (noting apparent
ambiguity in the interpretation of "willful").
158. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys.,
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Realtime Data, LLC v.
Stanley, 2010 WL 2403779 at *7 (E.D.Tex. June 10, 2010) ("[T~he Federal
Circuit specifically requires that a patentee [alleging willful infringement] meet
the requirements of Federal Rules 8(a) and I1(b) at the time the original com-
plaint is filed.") (internal citations omitted).
159. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
160. Id.
161. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.162
Thus, to plead willful infringement, the patentee should show that the
defendant had knowledge of the patent-in-suit and infringed in spite of such
knowledge. Because the factors the fact finder may consider are so numer-
ous, the patentee should only have to plead enough factual allegations to
plausibly raise a single genuine issue of material fact.163 After Iqbal, a suffi-
ciently pled complaint requires factually supported allegations showing some
or all of the willfulness factors. While the plaintiff need not prove his case at
the pleading stage, facially plausible implications supported by facts must be
pled to allow the court to infer wrongdoing by the defendant.
4. Inequitable Conduct
In patent infringement cases, parties often raise the defense of patent
invalidity due to inequitable conduct by the patentee.164 The Federal Circuit
defined inequitable conduct as a "failure to disclose material information, or
submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive, and those
two elements, materiality and intent, must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence."65 "Information is material if there is a 'substantial likelihood that
a reasonable examiner would have considered the information important in
162. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
163. A previous declaratory judgment suit against the plaintiff by the defendant
could be enough to show facial plausibility of knowledge of the patent-in-suit.
Mitutoyo Corp. v. Cent. Purchasing, LLC, 499 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("[The plaintiff] further provided details about the declaratory judgment
suit filed by [defendant] in 1995, which sought to invalidate and render unen-
forceable the '902 patent, thereby establishing that [the defendant] had knowl-
edge of the '902 patent prior to 2002. This is plainly more than sufficient to
meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) for pleading a willful infringement claim
and avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)."). The absence of an infringement
opinion letter from counsel, however, may not be used as evidence of willful
infringement. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345. See also Realtime Data LLC
v. Stanley, 2010 WL 2403779 at *7 ("Seagate clearly requires a patentee to do
more than suggest that more definite allegations are to follow once discovery is
underway."). The infringement contentions do not directly apply to the factors
of willful infringement, but they can still be used as a guide: each factor should
be laid out with relevant evidence that tends to support wrongdoing by the
accused. See N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1.
164. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("The habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every patent case
has become an absolute plague.").
165. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989), affd, 968 F.2d 1227
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2009). While there are multiple scenarios which constitute inequita-
ble conduct, the most prevalent is failure to disclose a reference during prose-
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deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."166 The intent
to deceive requires more than gross negligence.167 After the accused in-
fringer defendant has established "threshold findings of materiality and in-
tent,168 the court applies "a balancing test in which the court weighs the
materiality of the prior art and evidence of the applicant's intent to deceive
the PTO to determine whether there was inequitable conduct."6 9
The Federal Circuit held that "[i]nequitable conduct, while a broader
concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity under Rule 9(b)."170 The
purpose of the heightened pleading requirement for inequitable conduct is to
"provid[e] an opposing party with adequate notice, deter a party from assert-
ing claims as a pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs, and protect
those whose reputation would be harmed as a result of being subject to fraud
charges."171 "A pleading that simply avers the substantive elements of ineq-
uitable conduct, without setting forth the particularized factual bases for the
allegation, does not satisfy Rule 9(b)."172 Rule 9(b) states that "[m]alice,
cution. See Kimberly A. Moore, et al., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 615
(3d. ed. 2008) (original edition year).
166. Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 928 F.2d
1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The USPTO also more narrowly defined infor-
mation as material "when it is not cumulative to information already of record
or being made of record in the application, and (1) it establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of un-patentability of a
claim; or (2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) opposing an argument of un-patentability relied on by the [PTO], or (ii)
asserting an argument of patentability." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2000).
167. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 ("[A] finding that a particular conduct amounts to
'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive.").
168. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
169. Steven D. Moore, Fed. Cir. Raises Bar for Inequitable-Conduct Claims, Oct.
12, 2009 NAT'L L.J. 18 (Col. 1); accord K. MOORE, supra note 165, at 598.
170. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
171. In re Certain Bulk Welding Wire Containers and Components Thereof And
Welding Wire, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-686 2009 WL 4757312 at *3 (Dec. 7,
2009).
172. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326-27. "The foregoing purposes of Rule 9(b) are
equally important in an ITC hearing, and inequitable conduct should be pled
with the same high standard before the Commission as the Federal Circuit re-
quires in the district courts." In re Certain Bulk Welding, 2009 WL 4757312 at
*3. The Federal Circuit has also distinguished inequitable conduct from com-
mon law fraud: "inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than
common law fraud . . . . Inequitable conduct in fact is a lesser offense than
common law fraud, and includes types of conduct less serious than 'knowing
and willful' fraud." Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d
1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998).
2010] 325
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally."l73 In contrast, the Federal Circuit stated that "a pleading of ineq-
uitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient allegations of under-
lying facts from which a court may reasonably infer [both elements of the
claim]."I74 "A reasonable inference is one that is plausible and that flows
logically from the facts alleged, including any objective indications of candor
and good faith."175 The facts provided to support an allegation of inequitable
conduct are not required to be "a smoking gun, but rather sufficient grounds
to infer the requisite knowledge and intent."76
To particularly plead inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit in Ex-
ergen held "that . . . Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who,
what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omis-
sion."l77 The required information needed to sufficiently plead inequitable
conduct may be publicly available such as prior art not disclosed to the
PTO.178 In many cases, however, the large amount of factual allegations nec-
essary to plead inequitable conduct may preclude asserting the defense at the
beginning of the case.179 "Taking discovery before asserting an inequitable
conduct claim may . . . be necessary given Exergen's requirement[s]."180 In
addition, inequitable conduct usually only occurs in exceptional cases and it
is not appropriate to plead it in every infringement case.181 It may be prudent
for an accused infringer to wait to assert the defense until discovery has be-
gun and some factual allegations supporting the specific elements are found
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
174. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328-29. The Exergen court also stated "[p]leading on
'information and belief is permitted under Rule 9(b) when essential informa-
tion lies uniquely within another party's control, but only if the pleading sets
forth the specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably based." Id. at 1330.
175. Id. at 1329 n.5.
176. Konami Digital Entm't Co., Ltd. v. Harmonix Music Sys., Inc., No. 6:08cv286-
JDL, 2009 WL 5061812, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009).
177. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327.
178. See Steven D. Moore, Fed. Cir. Raises Bar for Inequitable-Conduct Claims,
Oct. 12, 2009, NAT'L L.J. 18 at 3.
179. See generally id.
180. Id. In fact, "several courts have noted that it is appropriate not to assert an
inequitable conduct claim until discovery supports it." Id. These cases include
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com Inc., 255 F.R.D. 366, 372 (D. Del. 2009) and
Douglas Press, Inc. v. Tabco, Inc., No. 00 C 7338, 2004 WL 1144054 at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004).
181. See Kimberly A. Moore, et al., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 598 (3d. ed.
2008) (original edition year).
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due to the heightened requirements of pleading inequitable conduct under
Rule 9(b).182
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The standard for patent pleadings is uncertain after lqbal. This article
attempts to systematically define an element-by-element, factually-supported
approach in order to plead patent infringement related causes of action. The
Iqbal Court stated that "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon its judicial experience and common sense."183 In drafting
pleadings, the litigant should therefore put on a "judicial hat" and self-cri-
tique using experience and common sense.
While the minimum requirements for patent infringement pleadings re-
main unclear, a useable guide can be distilled from the guidelines articulated
by the Supreme Court's Twombly and Iqbal decisions, the Federal Circuit's
decisions in McZeal and Exergen, and local patent rules' requirement for
infringement contentions. First, the elements of the cause of action should be
pled with particularity based on statutes and common law articulations. Sec-
ond, the plaintiff should plead facts showing or supporting an inference of
misconduct by the defendant for each element to attempt to minimize the
plausibility of the "defendant's efforts to stay in neutral territory."l84 What
was once required by local rules for infringement contention claims may now
be necessary as part of an initial pleading.185 Third, while not required, it
may be advisable to include a claim chart with the pleading.186 A plaintiff
that follows this systematic method and supports each element of a claim
with factual evidence or inferences will provide the court with a facially
plausible patent pleading capable of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
182. See Steven D. Moore, Fed. Cir. Raises Bar for Inequitable-Conduct Claims,
Oct. 12, 2009, NAT'L L.J. 18.
183. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
184. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
185. See N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rules 3-1 (2008).
186. As discussed above in note 101, including a claim chart with the pleading has
the additional benefit of getting the plaintiffs claim construction in front of the
judge very early.
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